oleh admin | Mar 25, 2025 | government, health and healthcare economics, healthcare and medicine, healthcare industry, medicine and healthcare
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The Kenya Ministry of Health has called for applications from citizens of Kenya to occupy several open roles within the Universal Healthcare initiative.
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The successful applicants will be employed with the State Department of Medical Services for two-year contract terms that can be renewed.
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The vacancies posted by the ministry encompass roles such as drivers, engineers, accountants, and health informatics officers.
Japhet Ruto, who works as an editor for LIFEHACK.co.ke, boasts over eight years of expertise in finance, business, and technology sectors. He offers comprehensive analysis of economic patterns both in Kenya and internationally.
The Kenya Ministry of Health has announced 55 employment opportunities for job hunters through the State Department for Medical Services.

Under which project will the candidates be working?
On Tuesday, March 25, an advertisement appeared on both the ministry’s website and in the government publication My Gov, announcing that selected individuals would be working with the Universal Healthcare (UHC) initiative.
The ministry stated that candidates who excel in the interviews will receive two-year contracts that can be extended.
“To support the digital transformation of healthcare information technology for the Universal Health Care initiative, the State Department for Medical Services has joined forces with the Safaricom Consortium and set up a project management office to oversee the implementation of this endeavor. This venture plans to recruit qualified personnel to staff the openings within the project management office under a renewable two-year contract, as detailed below,” the advertisement stated.
What positions were announced by the Ministry of Health?
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Project manager.
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Technical Manager (Technical Operations) – Five Openings.
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Technical manager (system infrastructure).
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Project support manager.
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Software Engineer (Design and Development) – Five Openings.
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Software Engineer specializing in Quality Assurance – we’re looking for five individuals.
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Software Engineer (Support and Maintenance) – Five Openings.
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Systems Infrastructure Engineer roles – we have two openings.
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Cybersecurity Engineer – opening for two roles.
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Cloud Infrastructure Engineer – Need Two Candidates.
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Network Operations Engineer – Need Two Candidates.
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Health Informatics Officer role – we have five openings.
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Finance officer.
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Accountant.
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Supplies and logistics officer.
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HR and administrative manager.
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Junior Engineer – Six Roles Available.
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Accounts assistant.
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Administrative assistant roles – two openings.
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Driver – three positions.
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Administrative aides – two roles needed.
How can one apply for positions at the Ministry of Health?
The ministry instructed potential and qualified Kenyan citizens to submit their applications for the open positions via its online application system.

Candidates can submit their educational and work experience documents by Tuesday, April 8.
Applicants who are interested and meet the qualifications should submit their applications via the online recruitment portal available on the Ministry of Health’s website by Tuesday, April 8, 2025.
Has the government violated laws in the new healthcare procurement process?
Safaricom along with two other firms teamed up to deliver the Integrated Healthcare Information Technology System (IHITS) for the Social Health Authority, which is being led by President William Ruto’s administration.
The auditor general’s report indicated that the acquisition of the KSh 104 billion system bypassed procurement regulations.
Nancy Gathungu, the Auditor General, highlighted unfavorable terms within the procurement agreement that strip the government of control over the newly launched social health initiative.
What Ruto commented on the difficulties faced by SHA
The report came out following Ruto’s acknowledgment of the issues plaguing the Universal Health Coverage program.
At a church service held on Sunday, March 2 in Roysambu, Nairobi County, Ruto stated that despite the challenges ahead, SHA would ultimately be successful, highlighting it as one of the country’s biggest initiatives.
In December 2024, the president dismissed those who criticized the new healthcare coverage, asserting that his government would demonstrate their skepticism was unfounded by making sure SHA succeeds.
oleh admin | Mar 25, 2025 | government, news, politics, politics and government, politics and law
Although domestic security law hasn’t been implemented as extensively as anticipated, authorities have been encouraged to reveal greater details regarding its usage.
For Chan Po-ying from the League of Social Democrats, the instant effect of Hong Kong’s localized version of the national security law, which took effect a year ago, hit her like a blow to the stomach.
Following the enactment of the National Security Protection Ordinance in March, she will have to wait an additional two and a quarter years before her husband, known as “Long Hair” Leung Kwok-hung—a previous legislator—can be released. In a significant sedition case from last November, he was sentenced to serve six years and nine months behind bars.
Chan, who dedicated 50 years to promoting social equity in the city and now serves as the chairwoman of what was formerly considered the radical faction of the pan-democratic movement, believed that Leung might have been released as soon as 2027. This expectation factored in his previous four years in detention along with an additional reduction of up to one-third off his total sentence due to exemplary behavior during incarceration.
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Nevertheless, the recent legislation mandates that prisoners found guilty of offenses related to national security should not receive sentence reductions unless the authorities confirm that this step would pose no threat to national security. Certain activists have faced restrictions on early release following the implementation of the updated national security law.
Chan, who is 69 years old, stated, ‘We understand that hoping for an early release would be unwise because it would merely result in greater disillusionment later.’
“What matters to me is that his time in prison could become more meaningful,” she said, speaking about her incarcerated spouse who will turn 69 this Thursday.
Regardless of any new laws, her party remains one of the few opposition groups that continue to organize demonstrations outside government buildings.
On its one-year anniversary this Sunday, the law enacted under Article 23 of the Basic Law has been applied cautiously, according to legal professionals and political figures, who point out the limited number of arrests and convictions. The Basic Law serves as the city’s constitutional document.
However, others argued that the complete effects of the legislation, encompassing 39 offenses, ought to be evaluated gradually and across a wider spectrum. They highlighted what they termed its “discouraging influence” on free expression and political engagement.
Containing seditious speech and ‘absconders’
Based on information from governmental sources acquired by the Post, up until March 1st, law enforcement has detained 320 individuals accused of compromising national security pursuant to all pertinent regulations in the region since 2020, following the implementation of Beijing’s iteration of such legislation.
The data shows 91 people and four companies were charged under the 2020 law, with 76 people convicted.
Five were charged under the new domestic national security law, with three sentenced, according to the government.
The government refused to disclose specific figures on how many people had been arrested under the new ordinance, citing its work in defending national security.
However, an examination conducted by The Post of publicly accessible statements and reports revealed that officials primarily utilized the ordinance—which encompasses charges such as treason, rebellion, incitement to revolt, theft of government intelligence, and foreign meddling—in two main ways: suppressing activities deemed seditious and curtailing backing for individuals who fled after being charged with endangering national safety.
As per official announcements, the 13 publicly reported arrests conducted under the ordinance were exclusively linked to charges of sedition.
Under the new law, it is illegal to commit any act, utter words, print, publish, sell, distribute or display any publication with seditious intention.
The crime carries a penalty of up to seven years in prison, which can extend to a maximum of 10 years if the offense includes collaboration with an “outside entity,” like a foreign government, organization, or individuals acting on their behalf.
The offense formerly had a maximum prison term of three years under Sections 9 and 10 of the colonial-era Crimes Ordinance, which has now been abolished.
Police made their first and largest arrests in May of last year, detaining eight people for allegedly publishing seditious materials linked to the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, ahead of its anniversary on June 4. The eight included activist Chow Hang-tung, but no public information has been available to determine if they have since been charged.
Based on statements and media reports, five people have been charged with sedition to date. Among them, three admitted guilt and received prison terms of up to 14 months.
displaying
anti-government slogans or
persistently posting
Videos and images urging officials to resign.
In the meantime, the government has utilized its newly acquired authority from the ordinance two times now to enforce punitive actions against 13 opposition figures based abroad. This includes activists Nathan Law Kwun-chung and Ted Hui Chi-fung, both of whom have been declared fugitives.
In addition to revoking the passports of absconders, the government has also banned individuals from providing financial support, renting properties to, or engaging in business collaborations with these persons. Those who violate this prohibition could face up to seven years in prison if convicted.
Even though skepticism exists regarding the impact of these actions, Lau Siu-kai—a consultant for the semi-governmental Beijing-based organization known as the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macau Studies—asserted that such steps might diminish their capabilities since potential supporters would be hesitant to back them.
He contended that these activists, who persisted in campaigning against both Beijing and the Hong Kong authorities, would likely see their influence wane over time if they couldn’t retain their supporters. Despite the rewards on their heads possibly garnering backing from international entities, this alone wouldn’t be enough to sustain them.
The measures could deter those who had yet to be placed on the wanted list but wished to organise activities overseas, he added.
Lau stated that the use of the sedition charge by law enforcement indicated their intention to crack down on forms of “gentle resistance” within the city, noting that there have been neither violent protests nor many demonstrations since 2019.
He stated that the emphasis in preventing activities threatening national security would be on individuals using peaceful methods to promote hostility and disapproval towards the government.
Lau was convinced that over time, the ordinance would be implemented more sparingly as enforcement actions were carried out and the boundaries of sedition were delineated by the judiciary.
“As it aims to be preventative, preemptive, and a deterrent,” he stated.
‘Cautious’ application of the law
Simon Young Ngai-man, a barrister and law professor at the University of Hong Kong, concurred that the legislation has yet to be thoroughly examined after one year since its implementation.
He mentioned that we haven’t witnessed the complete impact of the [ordinance] yet,” adding that this might be for the best.
The ordinance, along with the law imposed from Beijing, has “completed the national security framework,” according to Young, highlighting its robust and “unusually powerful” provisions.
“Put differently, the law seems to be achieving its aim of keeping individuals far from the red lines,” he noted.
Young expressed his desire for greater transparency from the government regarding the application of the law, including details on the frequency of use—or lack thereof—of pre-charge detention powers.
According to the ordinance, when investigating a national security case, the police can prolong the pre-charge detention time for an arrested individual beyond the usual 48 hours by up to another 14 days, provided they obtain authorization from a magistrate.
Secretary for Security Chris Tang Ping-keung had formerly defended the policy, stating that it provided enough time for law enforcement to probe national security offenses while still safeguarding individual liberties.
Young pointed out that comparable national security laws in other regions featured independent oversight committees, offering transparency and details about the implementation of these statutes. This was absent from the city’s own national security regulations.
He suggested that increasing transparency could be achieved if the government revealed more details about the application of the law.
Grenville Cross, who is both a barrister and the city’s ex-director of public prosecutions, stated that the Article 23 legislation has thus far been implemented “with prudence and moderation.”
He observed that the law was invoked infrequently and remarked that every instance was handled with “wise and impartial judgment” by the judicial system.
“The regulations are explicit, and everyone understands their position,” Cross stated. “Should individuals decide to violate these rules, regardless of their reasons, they should anticipate repercussions, as this is a standard aspect of judicial systems across the globe.”
Previously, some international investors expressed reservations regarding the ordinance and its potential impacts before it was enacted last March. Most were especially concerned about the introduction of clauses related to “state secret theft” and “foreign meddling that threatened national security.” Nonetheless, up until now, details concerning these aspects of the legislation have not been made available to the general public.
Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee, who previously served as the security minister and currently leads the crucial decision-making body known as the Executive Council, stated that the recent legislation has minimal effects on society, noting that only a small number of individuals have faced prosecution under it.
“It has had significantly lesser effects on civil society and the business environment compared to US President Trump’s executive orders,” she stated.
Beyond the arrests
However, Thomas Kellogg, who serves as the executive director of the Center for Asian Law at Georgetown University in Washington, suggested that assessing this legislation based merely on the count of arrests and utilized provisions would be insufficient. He contended that its wider ramifications hold greater significance, even though these effects prove more challenging to record or measure accurately.
He stated that the offense of sedition, in particular, has turned into a “major instrument for penalizing political expression,” and he noted that its persistent application continues to harm Hong Kong’s standing within the global community.
“The challenge of setting boundaries around free expression lies in the fact that the government must continuously monitor these limits, lest people believe they can once again utter specific statements and subsequently do just that,” he explained.
This makes it harder for the government to claim to the global community that they are moving past 2019 and 2020.
John Burns, a retired professor from the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong, voiced similar worries about the use of the sedition charge. He stated that this offense has been employed to “suppress government criticism, foster self-censorship, and bolster support for the authorities.”
This involves transforming the political climate in Hong Kong… shifting it from an environment that emphasizes engagement, variety, and transparency to one that prioritizes compliance, uniformity, and responsibility.
A representative from the government informed the Post that the ordinance was designed to precisely target actions threatening national security and clearly define the components and consequences of these offenses to tackle, counteract, discourage, and stop such activities.
He stated that it affects merely a very tiny segment of the population without infringing upon the fundamental rights and liberties rightfully held by Hong Kong residents.
The National Security Department established a reporting hotline in November 2020 for citizens to submit tips. As of February 28 of this year, officials noted that over 890,000 pieces of information have been received through this channel.
Apart from arrests, watchers have observed an increasing number of cultural programs showcasing artists who criticize the government getting abruptly canceled throughout the previous year. They attribute this phenomenon to the ordinance instilling fear among individuals about transgressing boundaries.
In last November, the Hong Kong band Kolor along with singer Pong Nan Yik-pong canceled their performances. Previously, both had expressed backing for the anti-government demonstrations of 2019.
Although Kolor chalked up the incident to “unavoidable circumstances,” Nan faced the cancellation of his event venue booking. Subsequently, the former secretary for culture, sports, and tourism Kevin Yeung Yun-hung stated that multiple factors might have led to these cancelations.
Chan remembered that the police officers, who previously just watched from the sidelines without interfering with her group’s activities at the street booths, began documenting her speeches instead. This made her increasingly cautious about choosing her words carefully to prevent any accusations of sedition.
Previously, the League of Social Democrats organized two demonstrations at the West Kowloon Court to show solidarity with their incarcerated members once the nationally secured laws enacted by Beijing were implemented.
However, last May, when the court issued guilty verdicts against 14 out of 16 opposition figures who challenged their subversion accusations in a significant national security trial, she was detained along with four others.
Then, in February, she called off her party’s demonstration over the city’s annual budget blueprint, an annual ritual that had attracted a handful of members outside the government headquarters, citing the “strong pressure” they came under, without giving details.
Chan stated that although she had doubts about her group’s prospects, she was not willing to relinquish her freedom of expression lightly, particularly concerning her opinions on local living conditions, politics, and economics.
There’s no justification for impeding us, provided our actions and statements remain within legal bounds,” she stated. “No entity ought to limit citizens’ freedom of expression.
Additional reporting by Harvey Kong
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This article originally appeared on the South China Morning Post (www.scmp.com), the leading news media reporting on China and Asia.
Copyright (c) 2025. South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved.
oleh admin | Mar 25, 2025 | federal government, government, politics, politics and government, politics and law
1999-Constitution
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On Friday, March 17, 2023, President Muhammadu Buhari approved and enacted 16 of the 35 Constitution Amendment Bills that had been ratified by both the national legislature and more than two-thirds of the state assemblies, adhering to Section 9(2) of the 1999 Constitution.
According to Section 9 (2) of Nigeria’s Constitution, “A law enacted by the National Assembly to amend this Constitution—excluding those covered under Section 8 of this same Constitution—cannot be adopted in either chamber unless at least two-thirds of all the members in that particular chamber support it. Additionally, such a proposed amendment must also receive approval through resolutions from over two-thirds of all state assemblies.”
Among the significant bills approved by the former president under the Fifth Amendment Acts were provisions granting financial autonomy to state legislatures and judiciary bodies; transferring control over railways from the exclusive legislative list to the concurrent one; empowering states to produce, transmit, and distribute electricity within regions serviced by the national grid; mandating that the President and governors must present nominees for ministerial or commissioner positions to the Senate or state legislature for approval within 60 days after assuming their posts; and directing government policies toward upholding the right to food and food security in Nigeria.
The enactment of these groundbreaking laws occurred during a crucial juncture in Nigerian history. In recent times, demands for power decentralization—nay, genuine federalism—had reached such high levels that they were impossible to overlook. It’s somewhat perplexing how the president’s approval of these pivotal pieces of legislation largely escaped notice among most Nigerians, potentially marking yet another misstep by the previous government. This occurrence coincided with persistent long lines at gas stations and ATMs across commercial banks due to fuel shortages and severe cash deficits. Adding insult to injury, this presidential endorsement happened just before gubernatorial and state house assembly elections, when the country was engrossed in what felt like another critical political showdown.
Similar to other nationalist organizations in Nigeria, this newspaper seems to have voiced its concerns repeatedly about the necessity for power decentralization and a return to the comprehensive federal system of the First Republic. In several editorials, we previously stated in part:
The British government did not believe that a nation encompassing extensive territories and comprising various ethnic groups with distinct histories, tongues, and customs could sustain governance through a central authority indefinitely. Hence, when the colonial Nigerian governor, Sir Arthur Richards, introduced the concept of federalism prior to announcing the Richards Constitution in 1946, he expressed this notion rather indirectly: ‘It would be necessary to establish a political framework … where these varied components can advance at different paces harmoniously and seamlessly toward greater integration economically, socially, and politically without compromising the core values and aspirations embedded in their differing lifestyles.’
The federal structure passed down to Nigeria through the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 and the Independence Constitution of 1960 represented a balance struck between the divisive and unifying forces present across various Nigerian regions. In 1954, esteemed leaders such as Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, and Ahmadu Bello opted for a comprehensive federated system as the foundation of their national identity.
Certainly, the move initiated by General Aguiyi Ironsi’s military government through Decree 34 of 1966—commonly referred to as the ‘Unification Edict’—to discard the heritage of federalism sparked violent uprisings in the Northern region. This series of incidents eventually resulted in a protracted and expensive three-year-long civil conflict.
Successive military regimes gradually dismantled the federal system. The current unitary framework masquerading as federalism, wherein everything ultimately leads back to Abuja, cannot endure. This paradoxical situation—where an increase in revenue from crude oil sales correlates with greater poverty among the populace—is largely due to our abandonment of the federalist principles established by Nigeria’s founders. These foundational tenets were based on fiscal federalism, ensuring that every region or state benefited directly from resources they generated. In fact, substantial progress occurred across these regions during those times when genuine federalism prevailed.
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