As President Donald Trump and billionaire Elon Musk work to overhaul the federal government, they’re forcing out thousands of workers with insider knowledge and connections who now need a job.

For Russia, China and other adversaries, the upheaval in Washington as Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency guts government agencies presents an unprecedented opportunity to recruit informants, national security and intelligence experts say.

Every former federal worker with knowledge of or access to sensitive information or systems could be a target. When thousands of them leave their jobs at the same time, that creates a lot of targets, as well as a counterespionage challenge for the United States.

“This information is highly valuable, and it shouldn’t be surprising that Russia and China and other organizations — criminal syndicates for instance — would be aggressively recruiting government employees,” said Theresa Payton, a former White House chief information officer under President George W. Bush, who now runs her own cybersecurity firm.

Many agencies oversee crucial data

Each year an average of more than 100,000 federal workers leave their jobs. Some retire; others move to the private sector. This year, in three months, the number is already many times higher.

It’s not just intelligence officers who present potential security risks. Many departments and agencies oversee vast amounts of data that include personal information on Americans as well as sensitive information about national security and government operations. Exiting employees could also give away helpful security secrets that would allow someone to penetrate government databases or physical offices.

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, for instance, maintains information on trade negotiations that could help an adversary undercut the United States. Federal records house data on clandestine intelligence operations and agents. Pentagon databases contain reams of sensitive information on U.S. military capabilities. The Department of Energy oversees many of the nation’s most closely guarded nuclear secrets.

“Even during favorable periods, this occurs — when an individual within the intelligence sector, driven by personal financial gain or other motivations, approaches an embassy with the intention of betraying America — however, DOGE has elevated this practice to unprecedented heights,” stated John Schindler, a previous counterintelligence officer.

“Someone is going to go rogue,” he said. “It’s just a question of how bad it will be.”

Only a tiny fraction of the many millions of Americans who have worked for the federal government have ever been accused of espionage. The overwhelming number are conscientious patriots who would never sell out their country, Payton said.

Background checks, employee training and exit interviews are all designed to prevent informants or moles — and to remind departing federal employees of their duty to preserve national secrets even after leaving federal service.

A single individual can cause significant harm.

It takes only one or two misguided or disgruntled workers to cause a national security crisis. Former FBI agent Robert Hanssen and former CIA officer Aldrich Ames, who both spied for Russia, show just how damaging a single informant can be.

Hanssen divulged sweeping information about American intelligence-gathering, including details that authorities said were partly responsible for the outing of U.S. informants in Russia who were later executed for working on America’s behalf.

The odds that one angry former employee reaches out to a foreign power go up as many federal employees find themselves without a job, experts said. What’s not in doubt is that foreign adversaries are looking for any former employees they can flip. They’re hunting for that one informant who could deliver a big advantage for their nation.

“It all comes down to the figures,” said Schindler.

Frank Montoya Jr., a retired high-ranking FBI official and ex-top U.S. government counterintelligence leader, expressed lesser worry over seasoned intelligence agency personnel violating their pledges and defecting to adversarial nations like America’s enemies. However, he highlighted how numerous governmental employees outside these agencies might become targets for recruitment by countries such as Russia or China.

“When it comes to stealing intellectual property, taking sensitive technologies, or gaining access to power grids and financial systems, someone from the IRS or social services who is deeply concerned about what DOGE is doing might pose a greater threat,” Montoya stated.

Initially, military and intelligence personnel were mainly targeted by foreign spies seeking informants. However, with the vast amounts of data stored across numerous agencies, which could provide China or Russia with a strategic advantage, this focus has shifted.

“Over the past two decades or so, we’ve observed that both China and Russia have focused more on acquiring non-defensive and unclassified data. This trend aids their efforts to upgrade their armed forces and improve their infrastructure,” explained Montoya.

Engaging online has made things simpler compared to past times.

The internet has significantly simplified the process for foreign countries to pinpoint and enlist possible informants.

Once, Soviet intelligence officers had to wait for an embittered agent to make contact, or go through the time-consuming process of identifying which recently separated federal employees could be pliable. Now, all you need is a LinkedIn subscription and you can quickly find former federal officials in search of work.

“You go on LinkedIn, you see someone who was ‘formerly at Department of Defense now looking for work’ and it’s like, ‘Bingo,'” Schindler said.

A clandestine intelligence agency or fraudster aiming to take advantage of a recently unemployed government employee might attract possible candidates by publishing a bogus employment listing on the internet.

A uniquely concerning scenario revolves around the possibility of a hostile entity arranging sham employment interviews to engage ex-federal employees as supposed consultants for a fictitious firm. These individuals might receive compensation for sharing their knowledge, all under the pretense of consultancy work, unaware that they’re inadvertently providing intelligence to adversaries. There have been instances where Russia has previously enlisted unsuspecting American citizens to act on its behalf.

Payton’s advice for former federal employees seeking employment mirrors her counsel for those dealing with federal counterintelligence; she stated, “Stay highly vigilant.”

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence did not respond to questions about the risks that a former federal worker or contractor could sell out the country. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard recently announced plans to investigate leaks within the intelligence community, though her announcement was focused not on counterespionage concerns but on employees who pass information to the press or the public.

In a statement, the office said it would investigate any claims that a member of the intelligence community was improperly releasing information.

The intelligence community includes numerous patriots who have contacted DNI Gabbard and her team personally, stating that they previously voiced concerns about these matters but were disregarded,” the office stated. “This will not continue to be the situation.