Last of two parts
There’s no clearer signal about U.S. President Trump’s probable approach towards mending ties with China, after moving away from his predecessor’s aggressive stance, than the gesture of inviting Chinese President Xi Jinping to attend his inauguration—the only foreign leader accorded this honor. Neither the leaders of Britain, America’s home nation and staunchest ally, nor those of neighboring countries like Canada and Mexico, received such an invitation.
Although he might keep up and perhaps escalate efforts to alter what he perceives as unfavorable trade deals with China and other nations like Mexico and Canada from his initial term, Trump’s social media team has labeled Biden’s international strategy a “trap for conflict”: referring to America’s aggressive stance which could lead to an all-out confrontation with the emerging global powerhouse. Their preferred catchphrases have consistently been “Use tariffs, not warfare” and “Employ tariffs, avoid deploying troops.”
Certainly, those serving under American influence, led by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who understands international diplomacy just as well as he grasps agricultural economics, will adhere to Uncle Sam’s stance. This alignment would only occur during the uncommon instances when a United States directive proves beneficial for our nation.
Biden has escalated President Obama’s major initiative launched in 2009 aimed at strategically limiting both China’s political influence and military expansion under the guise of what they call a “pivot to Asia.” This strategy stems from the dominant belief among America’s leaders—that their nation is predestined to be the only global superpower—supported by an ideology emphasizing their country’s distinctive populace, governmental framework, and capitalistic economy promoting democratic values and personal liberty.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which turned the global landscape into a unipolar order dominated by the United States, China at the dawn of the new millennium began to pose a significant challenge to American supremacy. This shift was largely due to China’s remarkable economic expansion. Joining forces with this rising power, Russia also ascended like a phoenix from the ruins of the former superpower.
Biden escalated Obama’s pivot strategy by establishing nine U.S. military bases in the Philippines—four additional ones atop those set up earlier under Obama—and deployed Typhoon intermediate-range missiles at one such base. He also forged stronger defense ties through agreements like AUKUS, QUAD, and bilateral accords with Japan and the Philippines aimed explicitly at preparing for potential military clashes against China. Biden further ramped up what he termed “freedom of navigation” patrols within the South China Sea to contest Beijing’s sovereignty assertions over certain areas. Additionally, his administration bolstered efforts to disseminate anti-Chinese narratives via organizations including the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and the Gordian Knot Institute based out of Stanford University, led reportedly by individuals connected to American intelligence agencies. These initiatives complemented ongoing support provided to Filipino coast guard activities opposing Chinese control over parts of the Spratly Islands, backed by clandestine assistance and strategic intel briefings.
China will demand that Trump order an end to these provocative activities, which will lead, finally after the insanity of the Aquino III and Marcos Jr. policies, to a new era in which the Philippines gets closer to its neighbor that could help it grow with its powerful economic engines.
Dictator
Biden’s rhetoric had been sharp, calling Xi Jinping a “dictator” and pledging to defend Taiwan if attacked, the first time the US stepped beyond its traditional official stance of ambiguity.
Despite being just under two months into his term, the Trump administration appears poised to seek improved relations with China for various reasons.
The first point is that Trump himself has shown hostility towards his predecessor, who is seen as an ideologically driven member of the Democratic Party with a perspective vastly different from his own.
None of Biden’s former foreign policy and security advisors—who essentially guided the older Biden—are part of this current team. For instance, his ex-National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan (responsible for orchestrating our dispute with China) and previous Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell (who persuaded then-Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario to relinquish Scarborough Shoal)—are not included here.
The key element influencing Trump’s position towards China revolved around his experience as a businessman. In contrast, Biden spent his entire career within the ideologically driven framework of the Democratic Party, shaping his understanding of China primarily through this lens. To him, China remained the same “Red China” from post-World War II days—a regime characterized by its autocratic governance and disregard for basic human rights. Even leaders like Mao were seen through this perspective, remembered not just for their policies but also associated with famines that resulted in the deaths of millions due to starvation.
Biden’s understanding of China was based mainly on information from secondary sources like presentations by policy experts and ideologues such as Sullivan and Campbell, along with conversations during meals or social gatherings with prominent figures within the Democratic Party. These party leaders generally agree that China poses a significant ideological threat similar to that once presented by the former Soviet Union.
Firsthand
On the contrary, Trump’s experience is direct, so to speak, via the enterprises he established in China and his interactions with Chinese firms based in New York. Since 2005, the Trump Organization has pursued hotel and branding opportunities in China, obtaining more than 126 trademarks by 2025. During his tenure at the Shanghai office between 2012 and 2016, connections were formed with government-backed organizations including the International Commercial Bank of China, a tenant within one of Trump’s towers, indicating personal engagement with both Chinese authorities and marketplaces. Furthermore, the Trump Organization secured significant financial backing from Chinese lenders; for instance, they received a loan worth approximately $950 million from the Bank of China in 2012 for real estate acquisition purposes. Additionally, owning an account with a Chinese bank acquainted him with Beijing’s economic landscape.
His history with businesses in China has made him cautious about cutting ties. Applying excessive pressure—such as increasing military tensions—could lead to repercussions for American corporations operating in those markets, which he considers his own sphere where he looks after their well-being. While tariffs do harm China, they are strategic rather than impulsive moves—he has stated, “I love tariffs; they’re my favorite.”
Trump maneuvered through China’s bureaucratic system and business environment, turning a profit from his dealings. He has often highlighted this fact, such as during a 2016 debate when he stated, “I have earned substantial amounts of money working with China.”
In 2017, Trump hosted Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago, providing a chance to assess the Chinese leader personally. From a businessman’s perspective, Trump probably views Xi as someone aiming for the most favorable terms for China rather than seeing him merely as a bully, as Biden does. During his term, Trump witnessed firsthand how China wields its economic influence through state-owned financial institutions, expedited trademark processes, and production tailored for his brand lines. To Trump, this makes China more of a counterpart in negotiations instead of solely being viewed as a strategic adversary.
Musk
Then we have Elon Musk, who stands out among Trump’s advisers. He rose to become the wealthiest person globally largely due to his company Tesla with its electric cars. Tesla runs a significant production site in Shanghai called Gigafactory Shanghai, established in 2019, having manufactured one million units of his bestselling Model Y in China. This makes the Model Y the top-selling EV in the country. Tesla was permitted to set up a completely independent plant in China—a privilege granted only after changes were made to the nation’s investment rules for foreign entities—without needing a domestic ally.
The manufacturing site in Shanghai stands as Tesla’s biggest production center worldwide, outdoing its Fremont, California, location in terms of scale and volume. This plant accounts for more than fifty percent of Tesla’s vehicles delivered across the globe, boasting an annual production capability above 750,000 automobiles.
The factory’s prosperity is backed by considerable financial support from Chinese government-run banks, which offered around $1.4 billion in loans with preferential terms. Additionally, a strong domestic supply chain has strengthened China’s electric vehicle industry.
After the United States, China stands as Tesla’s second-biggest market, making up approximately 40% of their worldwide sales and around 22 to 25 percent of overall revenue in recent times—for instance, $18 billion in 2022. Additionally, Tesla profits significantly due to China being pivotal in the international battery supply network; almost 40 percent of Tesla’s battery components come from Chinese firms, and this collaboration keeps growing stronger.
It’s unimaginable for Musk to simply lounge around as the US maintains its aggressive position towards China, which was initiated under Obama’s administration.
Sticking
However, there’s a snag: Trump’s streetwise strategy toward China, developed over decades of negotiating deals, might clash with the tough line taken by members of his administration. During a heated 2024 Senate hearing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio labeled China as a “generation-long challenge.” In contrast, National Security Advisor Mike Pick stated via an X post in January 2025 that he would confront Beijing’s assertiveness directly. Conservative lawmakers in Congress along with Trump supporters on social media platforms such as @EndWokeness have been advocating for a firm stance, echoing sentiments like “Mr. President, don’t get lenient on us!” This was part of a widely shared thread from March 2025 which garnered numerous retweets.
Although Trump is not particularly known for being swayed by his staff’s opinions, considering them merely as his employees, he often uses this approach. After all, his most recognizable catchphrase remains “You’re fired!” Alternatively, could it be that Trump has adopted hawkish stances just as a distraction from his actual favorable stance towards China?
Under Trump, China remains secure—yet so does a world rescued from the edge of nuclear conflict. I’m eagerly anticipating seeing those who were critical shift their stance when Biden takes over.
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